I’m learning German (the language) at the moment. We need more Germans in the movement. Germans are very useful. They are a race of ksatriyas.

I’m a great fan of German military doctrine actually. I’ve used some of my bandwidth lately to study the development of their tactical thought.

Central to German military thinking since the 19th century was the idea of Mission-type tactics (Auftragstatik in German).

From wikipedia:

In mission-type tactics the military commander gives its subordinate leaders a clearly defined goal and the forces needed to accomplish that goal with a time-frame within which the goal must be reached. The subordinate leader then implements the order independently. The subordinate leader is given, to a large extent, initiative and a freedom in execution which enables flexibility in order execution. Mission-type tactics free higher leadership levels from tactical details.

For the success of the mission-type tactics it is especially important that the subordinate leaders understand the intent of the orders and are given proper guidance and that they are trained so they can act independently. In contrast to the mission-type tactics is Command and control used by American armed forces.

It’s all about increasing the leadership capability at all levels of the organization.

Auftragstaktik can be seen as doctrine within which formal rules can be selectively suspended in order to overcome “Friction”. Carl von Clausewitz stated that “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult”. Problems will occur with misplaced communications, troops going to the wrong location, delays caused by weather etc., and it is the duty of the commander to do his best to overcome them. Auftragstaktik encourages commanders to exhibit initiative, flexibility and improvisation while in command. In what may be seen as surprising Auftragstaktik empowers commanders to disobey Orders and revise their effect as long as the intent of the commander is maintained.

Remember that scene in The Longest Day when the American commanders realize that they have been dropped on the wrong beach? An American General (shame on me for not knowing who), ends their indecision in how to proceed by saying: “The war starts here.”

Analysis by the US Army of the 1939 German campaign in Poland found that “The emphasis which the Germans placed on the development of leadership and initiative in commanders during years of preparatory training brought its rewards in the Polish campaign. With confidence that these principles had been properly inculcated, all commanders, from the highest to the lowest echelons, felt free to carry out their missions or meet changes in situations with a minimum of interference by higher commanders.” They recognised that “initiative, flexibility and mobility” were the essential aspects of German tactics.

OK, this is a building block. With leadership (independently thoughtful men) at every level of the organization decision-making can be decentralized, as long as vision is shared throughout the organization.

The earlier doctrine of Vernichtungsgedanke or “the concept of annhilation“, which essentially entailed a force-on-force approach with superior momentum to unbalance and subdue an enemy, resulted in the stalemate of the First World War when massively armed forces clashed with no decisive outcome.

In order to overcome this doctrinal failure the offensive operational-level military doctrine that came to be known as Blitzkreig was developed. It is based on a concept of Bewegungskrieg or “war of maneuver”.

The idea of Blitzkreig is to destroy an enemy’s decision-making capability with rapid mobility and deep penetration, destroying their command and supply infrastructure and thereby ending their ability to field resistance in a coordinated fashion, instead of attacking force-on-force. In this way although an enemy may still have significant force, it is unable to be deployed and they must surrender or be destroyed in a mop up operation.

The way that this was implemented was with air superiority providing close support to mobile armoured columns effecting deep penetration, followed by infantry.

With a command-and-control structure that emphasizes centralized decision-making, communication becomes the weak link. By disrupting communications and effecting tactical adaption that outpaces the enemy’s ability to make decisions and disseminate them, the attacking force retains the initiative throughout the engagement. This is in stark contrast to the idea of Attrition Warfare, where you win by basically exhausting your enemy’s forces, never a good idea unless you have massive force superiority, and even then not a good idea. The disruption of communications is effected by deep penetration of armoured elements, and the pace of tactical adaptation is accelerated through local communications networks (a radio in every tank), and, very importantly, Auftragstatik, or Mission-type tactics - local commanders making decisions quickly in response to changing circumstances, rather than radioing reports and awaiting orders.

This was very effective against the Soviets and the Allied forces in France.

If you read the book on Network-centric Warfare that I recommended a while ago, you might recognize these concepts. If you studied the present Iraq War (Operation Iraqi Freedom) you might also recognize the tactics. Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. Achievement of air superiority (very necessary), followed by a rapid deep penetration designed to destroy the enemy’s command and control capability. Rather than going force-on-force, you blow out their brains.

The defence against this type of attack is Defence in Depth, also known as elastic defense. In this type of arrangement forces are not arrayed in a static front, but are instead deployed in depth in concentric rings in order to prevent an enemy from flanking or attacking from the rear. The forces within this defensive structure then utilize the Hedgehog defense, where they form into perimeters and continue to fight when cut off and surrounded by penetrating elements during a blitzkrieg attack. This defense relies heavily on the initiative of the local commanders, and their awaremess of the doctrine. Elements may be cut off and surrounded, but they should not surrender.

The modern US doctrine of Network-centric Warfare is aimed at increasing the speed of the US force’s decision-making cycle, through shared situational awareness, to such a point where the defender is unable to seize the initiative. This is done through technological communications enabling centralized command and control structures to have increased access to information and communications networks, rather than through Auftragstatik, or empowerment of commanders. This is coupled with the idea of Rapid Dominance, where the idea is to overwhelm the enemy’s ability to resist by attacking all aspects of their will simultaneously. The Shock and Awe tactic of a massive display of firepower is part of this.

This weakness of this system is in an asymmetrical situation where they do not face a conventional enemy who can be conquered by “driving him into the sea”. The system is also reliant on the technological network. If this is disrupted, the effectiveness of the system is severely degraded. Asymmetric warfare is basically the only response to Network-centric Warfare.

With the speed of the intelligence gathering - decision making - decision communication cycle of the US forces you’ll be hard pressed to outpace them. Outgunning them is also out of the question. The only way to really go head-to-head conventionally with current US forces would be if you had a network or superior local decision-making capability, and were able to disrupt their network. That would work.

Otherwise, not allowing them to apply a massed force attack on your own communications network and attacking their will to fight is the only way. The Network-centric Warfare idea assumes an enemy with a centralized command-and-control structure and a massed force that can be overwhelmed with concentrated and coordinated attack by superior forces.

Basically they’ve driven everyone out of the game of conventional military warfare, which is why the war is now moving to the ideological level, attacking the motivation and will of the enemy. This is referred to as fourth-generational warfare,

Anyway, preaching application: I’m a big fan of Auftragstatik. Empower your local commanders to make decisions in alignment with the overall mission. Put people in charge of things and empower them to do the necessary. Give them the freedom to take decisions, and the freedom to make mistakes and to fail. But not continually. If they don’t learn from their mistakes, replace and redeploy them.

There is no “enemy’s decision-making cycle” to get inside of, but momentum is still critically important to avoid your preaching mission getting bogged down in trench warfare. Check out the summary of Andy Stanley’s talk on Momentum at Catalyst 2005. Maxwell calls it “the big Mo”.

Here is a page of leadership articles related to fourth generational warfare.